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How	pushing	hyper-specific	–	and	fact	free	–	policy
proposals	helps	politicians	like	Donald	Trump
When	election	candidates	and	politicians	address	voters,	they	often	face	a	choice	in	how	they	speak:
they	can	be	specific	in	what	they	propose,	or	they	can	be	deliberately	ambiguous.	Gustav	Meibauer
looks	at	the	trade-off	between	these	two	rhetorical	strategies,	and	argues	that	many	politicians	–	like
Donald	Trump	–	aim	to	get	the	best	of	both	worlds	by	choosing	to	be	hyper-specific	but	fact	free.	
Politicians	of	all	ideologies	face	a	strategic	challenge	in	how	they	communicate	with	voters.	Let’s
assume,	for	simplicity’s	sake	–	and	discard	the	Electoral	College	for	once	–	that	all	elected	officials	are	interested	in
getting	the	most	possible	votes,	and	nothing	else.	Very	generally,	there	are	then	two	effective	strategies	for	how
they	use	speak	and	communicate	(also	known	as	rhetoric)	they	can	use.	One,	is	to	be	deliberately	ambiguous	in
their	communication,	and	two,	to	be	precise	and	specific.	The	incentives	behind	both	strategies	are	usually
described	as	a	trade-off,	and	as	two	opposites	across	a	range	of	potential	communication	strategies.
The	upsides	and	downsides	of	ambiguity
On	one	end	of	that	range,	ambiguous	rhetoric	avoids	being	“pinned	down”	to	concrete	promises	or	suggestions.
Ambiguity	is	attractive	during	elections	because	candidates	need	to	signal	commitment	to	different	voter	groups	at
the	same	time	to	maximise	their	support.	When	it’s	unclear	which	candidate	voters	prefer,	as	well	as	less	important
compared	to	other	issues	in	the	eyes	of	prospective	voters,	appealing	to	broad	themes	common	across	voter
groups	rather	than	making	concrete	proposals	is	preferable.	On	foreign	policy,	for	example,	voters	may	even	reward
such	loose	rhetoric	where	it	appears	bipartisan.
Ambiguous	rhetoric	is	also	harder	to	fact-check	or	disprove.	Think	about	the	type	of	words	used	in	a	Fourth-of-July
speech.	Such	rhetoric	is	ceremonial,	and	more	about	presidential	“sound”	and	stock	phrases	rather	than	any
particular	content.	This	lends	itself	better	to	some	occasions	and	policy	areas	than	others:	for	example,	as	many
voters	lack	interest	in	and	knowledge	of	foreign	policy,	some	presidential	candidates	refrain	almost	entirely	from
engaging	in	detailed	discussions	about	it.	Politicians	would	then	take	specific	positions	only	in	specific	forums,
where	special	audiences	demand	them	and	where	they	are	easily	missed	by	the	public.
However,	overly	ambiguous	and	evasive	tactics	may	cause	problems	for	those	running	for	office.	The	speaker	risks
being	pressed	on	vague	rhetoric,	especially	in	situations	like	televised	debates	or	“townhalls”.	Audiences	may	see
through	well-trodden	verbiage	because	they	are	already	familiar	with	the	dynamics	of	elections.	They	may	have
learned	how	to	be	able	to	tell	when	a	candidate	is	telling	the	truth	or	not,	so	will	be	able	to	identify	when	a	candidate
just	tries	to	bullshit	their	way	through.	Voters	may	then	prefer	candidates	to	be	more	specific	to	reduce	the
uncertainty	associated	with	vague	positions.
Being	specific	often	signals	competence
On	the	other	end	of	the	range,	therefore,	a	rhetorical	strategy	of	specificity	and	precision	can	help	mobilize	specific
voter	groups.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	in	electoral	contexts,	it	may	signal	competence,	leadership	and	tell	voters
something	about	a	candidate’s	“character”.
Specificity	may	well	be	aimed	primarily	at	voter	motivation	and	mobilization.	Insofar	as	it	speaks	to	the	interests,
ideas	and	themes	important	to	some	people	(rather	than	others),	it	can	shore	up	support	in	those	that	care	deeply
about	the	specific	suggestion	that	is	made.	For	example,	a	suggestion	to	cut	foreign	aid	by	15	percent	and	instead
invest	the	saved	amount	into	the	military	speaks	to	a	specific	target	audience.	It	could	mobilize	voters	that	care
about	the	military	(or	do	explicitly	not	care	about	foreign	aid)	in	support	of	the	candidate.	By	extension,	however,	it
also	mobilizes	voters	that	care	about	foreign	aid	against	the	candidate.	The	speaker	(and	their	advisers)	must
decide	which	voter	group	is	larger,	more	likely	to	vote,	and	more	likely	to	vote	predominantly	on	their	views	on	that
specific	suggestion	(as	opposed	to	all	other	suggestions	also	made).	Politicians	can	get	this	estimation	wrong	in
systematic	ways.	Wanting	to	hedge	bets	may	lead	them	back	to	a	strategy	of	ambiguity.
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Importantly,	rhetoric	is	aimed	at	convincing	at	least	the	important	parts	of	the	electorate	of	the	candidate’s
expertise,	authority,	character	and	suitability	for	the	presidency.	Specific	knowledge	and	proposals	show
competence	and	expertise	on	a	topic	and	make	follow-up	questions	less	likely.	Being	specific	in	complex	political
environments	is	hard,	though,	especially	for	less	experienced	or	informed	candidates.
Credit:	U.S.	Marine	Corps	Lance	Cpl.	Cristian	L.	Ricardo	/	Public	domain
Why	candidates	and	politicians	are	ambiguously	specific
Being	faced	with	either	taking	an	ambiguous	rhetorical	stance	or	a	more	specific	one	can	pose	a	dilemma	for	those
running	for	office.	Usually,	candidates	do	not	want	to	commit	to	either	only	one	(which	may	alienate	other
audiences),	or	too	obviously	to	multiple	proposals,	ideas	and	themes	(which	runs	the	risk	of	making	contradictory
statements).	Instead,	candidates	can	use	overly	specific	suggestions	to	hide	their	ambiguity	and	their	lack	of	real
facts.
Bullshit	is	often	understood,	and	even	used	colloquially	as	synonymous	with,	ambiguous	or	unclear	statements.
However,	political	rhetoric	can	also	take	on	a	hyper-specific	nature,	comparable	to	adverts	that	use	made-up
medicinal	statistics	to	flog	snake	oil.	This	can	persuade	a	trusting	audience	of	the	speaker’s	evidence	for	their
statements	even	though	that	evidence	is	not	adequate	to	standards	of	truthful	speaking:	the	speaker	still	produces
bullshit.	Donald	Trump,	usually	prone	to	ambiguous	rhetorical	strategies,	is	a	good	example.
Again,	this	concerns	the	impression	of	what	is	said,	rather	than	factual	content.	Hyper-specific	bullshit	helps	sell	the
speaker’s	competence	because	it	sounds	detailed,	not	because	it	actually	is	(Donald	Trump’s	insinuation	that	two
medications	can	be	used	to	treat	COVID-19	is	factually	incorrect,	as	was	pointed	out	by	his	own	chief	medical
advisor	immediately	prior	to	his	statements	and	tweets).	In	seeking	to	maximise	potential	voter	shares,	a	politician
(like	Trump)	may	not	primarily	care	whether	their	proposal	actually	solves	the	issue	at	hand;	they	are	indifferent	to
truth	(in	opposition	to	the	liar,	who	deeply	cares	about	what	they	think	is	the	truth).	Their	motivation	lies	in	creating
an	impression	of	competent	leadership	during	crisis.
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The	importance	of	such	specific-yet-ambiguous	concepts	in	political	debates	increases	the	more	uncertain	actors
are	about	the	consequences	of	different	policies,	and	the	more	they	perceive	a	need	to	appeal	to	a	wide	range	of
diverse	voters.	The	latter	point	is	particularly	important	for	big-tent	candidacies	and	parties,	such	as	those	run	by
most	of	the	recent	Democratic	candidates,	and	presumably	less	so	for	narrower,	mobilization-focused	candidacies
such	as	Trump’s	in	2015/16.	Uncertainty	and	complexity	in	the	issue	at	hand	makes	it	more	likely	for	audiences	to
be	ignorant	or	indifferent	audiences.	This	makes	it	more	likely	that	hyper-specific	bullshit,	i.e.	trying	to	deceive
audiences	with	only	seemingly	detailed	proposals	that	hide	their	ambiguity	and	factual	emptiness,	is	successful.	In
turn,	this	makes	the	continuous	use	of	hyper-specific	bullshit	dangerous	(although	it	may	well	be	fun	elsewhere).
Especially	in	cases	where	uncertainty	should	be	communicated	clearly,	and	precision	needs	to	correlate	with	actual
expertise,	speakers	are	incentivized	to	bullshit	their	way	through.
The	dangers	of	playing	fast	and	loose	with	the	truth
This	dynamic	has	consequences	that	extend	further	than	elections,	most	notably	where	hyper-specific	proposals
end	up	actually	becoming	policy.	This	may	be	because	candidates	feel	bound	by	earlier	promises,	e.g.	to	avoid
losing	their	audience	from	backing	down	or	switching	position,	or	because	they	feel	that	thinking	of	alternative
options	once	in	office	is	overly	costly.
As	I	have	suggested	in	a	previous	blog	post,	bullshitting	may	well	be	a	rational	strategy	in	response	to	contrasting
incentives	embedded	in	the	electoral	system.	Looseness	with	truth	and	hyper-specificity	can	build	up	and	endanger
the	credibility	of	the	political	process.	Where	successful,	it	legitimizes	untruthfulness,	erodes	public	debate,	and	is
thus	harmful	to	a	functioning	democracy.
Political	and	electoral	dynamics	that	incentivize	politicians	to	latch	onto	nonsensical	proposals	because	they	might
appeal	to	potential	voters	are	especially	problematic	where	the	institutionalised	feedback	mechanisms	such	as
media	coverage,	audience	backlash	and	electoral	defeat,	are	not	operating	well	enough.	This	seems	to	increasingly
be	the	case	in	the	hyper-partisan	American	political	landscape.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper	‘Ambiguous	Specificity:	The	Production	of	Foreign	Policy	Bullshit	in
Electoral	Contexts’	published	in	Politics	(10.1177/0263395720936039),	as	part	of	the	special	issue	‘Elections,
Rhetoric	and	American	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Age	of	Donald	Trump’	(10.1177/0263395720935376)
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